

AN
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INTO THE
IMMATERIALITY
OF
THINKING SUBSTANCES,
HUMAN LIBERTY,
AND THE
ORIGINAL OF MOTION.

Particularly in ANSWER to a late Pamphlet, intituled,
*A Philosophical Enquiry into the Physical
Spring of Human Actions, and the
immediate Cause of Thinking.*

By WILLIAM WINDLE, A. B.

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The RIGHT REVEREND

FATHER in GOD,

R O B E R T,

Lord Bishop of *ELY*:

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Is Humbly Dedicated.

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Thinking Substances, &c.

§. I. **T**H E Opinion that hath prevailed in the World, since the Rise and Progress of Learning, and since Men have turned their Thoughts from the common Affairs of Life, more to *Philosophy*, and the *Investigation* of *Truth* is, that the *Human Nature* (beside its outward and visible *Compages*, or System of *organized Matter*)

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ter) hath a *Spiritual*, or *Immaterial Principle*, in the Union of which two Substances (absolutely different in themselves) Man consists.

§. II. The one is supposed inert, passive, and unintelligent; and incapable of moving Bodies, any otherwise than by *Impulse* and *Contact*, and in consequence of being first moved itself; the other active, intelligent, and capable of moving that Body to which it is united, unacted upon by any thing *ab extra*; that can recall, alter, and differently arrange its *Ideas*, free from any Hindrance whatever.

§. III. But there have not been wanting Men, even of Learning, and Abilities, who have erected a contrary *Philosophy*, and supported it with the Appearance of Argument, and Reason: Who have considered Men only as Matter under different Situations,

Situations, and consequently as meer *Automata*, or *Pieces of Clockwork*, only with this Difference, that whereas there is confessedly some Art in them, yet no rational Principle had any Hand in the Contrivance of the *Reasoning Engine*. Though they have considered themselves as Masters of *Reason* and *Philosophy*, they are wise enough to discover no Marks of Wisdom in their Formation, and Make ; but solve all by the *Physical* and *Mechanical Powers* of Matter.

§. IV. These Doctrines partly had their Abettors by the *Irreligious* of *ancient Days* ; from the Time of *Epicurus* down to that of his Follower *Lucretius*. But what they had only a *dim and seeming Conception of* in those *darker Ages of Infidelity*, hath been more fully brought to Light, and explained in these latter Times.

§. V. Much hath been said in the Course of Mr. *Hobbs's* Writings to support these Principles, which have again been retouched, and delivered to us with Additions and Improvements by Mr. *Collins* : But a late System of this Sort of *Philosophy*, exhibited to the Publick under the Title of *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Physicall Spring of Human Actions, and the Immediate Cause of Thinking*, surpasses any thing of the Kind, that I have heard of at least, and stands above all with *Infamous Preeminence*. The others only dallied with the Subject, and were for amputating the *Limbs of Religion*; this Gentleman *levels his deadly Aim at the Head of it*; and as nothing has yet appeared in Publick professedly in Answer to this *Enquiry*, it hath been thought by the Friends of the *Author*, that it surpasses the Abilities of any one to confute it.

§. VI.

§. VI. To let these Men see they are mistaken, as much in the Strength of his Reasoning, as he was in the Application of it, the following Sheets are offered to their Consideration. Though I would not willingly by this anticipate the Labour of some abler Hand : For as the Question is of great Importance, and previous, and fundamental to all others of a religious Nature, the Friends of Religion (I hope) have not too much at Heart, to neglect so useful an Undertaking, from any impertinent Attempt of mine. And I hope the Friends of the *Author* will be so candid as to allow, thro' my unskilful Management in *Me*, that I only can be the Sufferer, and not the *Cause*.

§. VII. The leading Principles upon which our Author proceeds in this Enquiry are ;

§. VI.

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First,

(a) First, That we have no Reason to conclude, that any Part of the Human Composition consists of Immaterial Substance; because we have no Ideas of any other Substance than Matter; and because there is nothing (that we know of) in the Nature of Matter, which is incompatible with Thinking.

Secondly, that it appears most evidently from the Nature of Cogitation, that Matter is the Subject of it; or in which Cogitation inheres.

Thirdly, That all Actions or Motions of Bodies must depend, necessarily, upon the two following Principles (b).

First, Upon the Physical and Mechanical Laws and Powers of the Bodies themselves that are in Motion; or,

Secondly, Upon the Impulse, or Contact of some other Bodies.

(a) Vide *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 3.

(b) *Ibid.* pag. 33.

§. VIII. It will be manifest, therefore, to any one that hath gone thro' with the Arguments, which he has brought to countenance these Propositions, he has laid down, and the Deductions or Corollaries that he has made, or that may be made from them, that his *established Principles* are, that there can be no *Liberty*, or *Self-motive Power* in Man, or any *Ruling Mind*, or *Deity* in the World; but that the Existence of the several Orders and Gradations of Beings can be attributed to nothing else for their Original, but to different *Modifications of Matter*, to which *Motion* is essential; and that consequently a *First Mover* is impossible.

§. IX. In Order therefore to evince the Absurdity of our Author's whole Scheme, I shall shew,

First, That we have great Reason to conclude, that some Part of

the Human Composition consists of *Immaterial Substance* ; because there is *something (that we know of) in the Nature of Matter, that is incompatible with Thinking.*

Secondly, That admitting the Intelligent Principle in Man is only Matter *fitly disposed* ; yet that it does not follow from thence, or from any thing else which our Author hath said, that Man is incapable of *Liberty*, or may not have a Power of beginning, stopping, and directing *Motion.*

Thirdly, That there must have been somewhere a Beginning of Motion, or a *First Mover.*

And in following this Subject under the Divisions abovementioned, I shall distinctly consider what our *Author* hath alledged in Confirmation of his own Hypothesis.

§. X. In tracing this Subject under the first Division, I am not vain
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enough to think I can throw a greater Light upon it, than (c) the late learned and judicious Dr. *Clarke* hath done, in his *Controversial Letters* with Mr. *Collins*, about the natural Incapacity of Matter to think, under any *Composition*, *Texture*, or *Modification* whatever. Every intelligent Reader determined (I believe) at that Time, that the *Doctor* had the best of the Question: But as our *Author* has taken up the Argument, where it rested between Dr. *Clarke* and his *Antagonist*; it will be necessary (in order to illustrate the Truth of my first Proposition) to give first, a short State of the Controversy, and the Pith of the *Doctor's* Argument upon that Head; and secondly, to shew that our *Au-*

(c) *Vide* Dr. *Clarke's* Defence of his Argument (made use of in his Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, to prove the Immateriality of the Soul) in Four Letters to Mr. *Collins*, the Author of the Remarks on his pretended Demonstration, &c.

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thor's Observations upon it are very unjust, and unphilosophical.

§. XI. The *Doct̃or* justly observed, that as *Thinking* was one simple, and individual Mode, it could not, with any Consistency, be affirmed of a divisible Substance; because all the Qualities of any one System of Matter being no more than the Sums or Aggregates of the Qualities of the different Parts which constitute the whole, if the *Thinking Substance* was Matter, it would follow that there must be as many *Thinking Substances*, as there were Parts that composed the whole; which was a Contradiction (*d*).

§. XII. To this Mr. *Collins* replied, that there were some Instances of Qualities (belonging to Ma-

(*d*) Vide Dr. *Clarke's* Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, pag. 24.

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terial Substances) which could not, with any Propriety, be affirmed of the *different Parts* of those Substances, though they might of the *Whole*; particularly the *Power* of a *Clock* to shew the Hour of the Day, (which could not be predicated of the *Wheels* or *Movements* separately considered, the *Power* of the *Eye* to contribute to the Act of Seeing, and the *Rotundity* of a *Globe*: And as each constituent Part of the *Clock*, or the *Eye* had, by its *Situation*, a Tendency to produce the *Power* affirmed of the *whole Clock*, or *Eye*; and as each of the constituent Parts of a *Globe* had, in like Manner, a Tendency to produce *Rotundity* in the *Whole*; so each Part of the Matter that composed the Thinking Substance might (by its Situation) have a Tendency to produce *Thought* in the *Whole*; though (when separately considered) neither of the Parts had any Portion of *Thinking*, or
were

were *Subjects* of any *Cogitation* at all.

§. XIII. Dr. *Clarke*, in Answer to these Observations of Mr. *Collins* (e), thought it necessary to make a three-fold Distinction of those *Properties*, or *Qualities* which are ascribed to *Material Substances*, under one of which Classes all their possible *Powers* or *Modes*, (whether known or unknown) must necessarily be included ; that is,

First, They must be *Qualities really inhering* in the *Subject itself*, to which they are ascribed ; or,

Secondly, *Modes* produced by it in some other Substance ; or,

Thirdly, *Mere abstract Names*, or *external Denominations*, that signify certain *Powers* or *Effects*, which do not *reside* in any Subject at all ;

(e) Vide Dr. *Clarke's* Letters to Mr. *Collins*, pag. 78, and 134.

such as *Magnetism*, *Attraction*, *Refrangibility*, and the like : After this Distinction was made, the Doctor insisted that *Thinking* (supposing it a *Predicate* of a material Substance) must be ranged under the first of these Divisions, and specifically agree with the primary and essential Qualities, *Solidity*, *Extension*, *Bulk*, &c. which are no more than the *Sums*, or *Aggregates* of the *Solidity*, *Extension*, *Bulk*, &c. of all the constituent Parts ; and consequently that *Thought* must, in like Manner, be the Sum of the *Thoughts* of the constituent Parts of the thinking Substance, (allowing it *material*) which is the Absurdity taken Notice of before.

§. XIV. The *Doctor* indeed agrees (f) with his Adversary, that each

(f) *Vide* Dr. Clarke's Letters to Mr. Collins, pag. 141.

of the Parts of a *round Body* was not possessed of that *Degree of Roundness*, as the *Whole*; or that the *Globosity* of any Piece of Matter was made up of the *Globosities* of the *different Parts*; but a *whole round Figure* (he says) must be made up of *Pieces of Roundness*, which are all of the same Kind with it; just as the *Number Twenty* is not made up of *several Twenties*; but of so many *Units*, which are the constituent Parts of the whole Number; in like Manner the *Power* of the *Eye* to contribute to the Act of Seeing means no more than this, that the *whole Eye* has a *Power of transmitting and refracting* more Rays of Light, than any single Part of that Organ; not that the *Power* of the *Whole* is distinct from, but an *Aggregate* of the *Powers* of the *different Parts*. And the *Power* of a *Clock*, to shew the *Hour* of the Day, differs nothing from the *Figure* and

and *Motion of the Wheels, and Hand* :
 So that Mr. *Collins* (in order to make
 these Instances directly parallel with
 that of *Consciousness*) must allow
 that *Consciousness* in the *Whole* is no
 more than the *Sum Total* of the
Consciousness of the different Parts :
 For as the different Parts of any
 System of Matter, wholly void of
Curvity, can never constitute a *round*
Circumference ; so the different Parts
 of any System of Matter wholly void
 of *Thinking* in Themselves, can never
 constitute *Thought*.

§. XV. Besides, no Part of any
round Body has by its Situation (g)
 a Tendency to produce *Rotundity*
 in the Whole ; for a Part has no
 more Tendency to the Whole, by
Composition, than the Whole has a
 Tendency to its Part by *Division* ;
 and the *Curvities* of the small Arches

(g) *Clarke's Letters, &c.* pag. 203,

that

that constitute the Circumference of a *Circle*, are not properly *Tendencies* towards Roundness, any more than the twelve Units, that constitute a *Dozen*, are so many *Tendencies* towards a *Dozen*, which are taken together the Number a Dozen, which is no more than a Name, or *external Denomination* given to the *Whole*; just as *Roundness* is a *Denomination* given to express the several *Curvities*, that make up a *Circle*; by a Parity of Reasoning therefore it will follow, if *Consciousness* is no more than the Sum of those Motions that occasion it, it can be nothing else but an *external Denomination* given to those Motions; that is a meer *Word*, or *Term of Art*, and no new *Quality*, or *Predicate* resulting from the Motions.

§. XVI. There is little more contained in Dr. *Clarke's Letters*, or in Mr. *Collins's Replies*, that will
serve

serve to clear up the Debate: *Our Author* seems to have taken it up where they left it; but in summing up their Arguments has industriously suppressed the chief, and principal Part of what *Dr. Clarke* has said on the Side of *Immateriality*; and has only insisted, that the Parallel of *Rotundity* and *Consciousness* is a just one, by endeavouring to prove that there is no Distinction between those *Qualities*, which are ranked under the three different Heads by *Dr. Clarke*; but that all those, which are called *sensible Qualities*, such as *Blueness*, *Sweetness*, *Hardness*, *Softness*, &c. that all *external Denominations*, and those *Qualities* which *Dr. Clarke* calls *Real*, and *Inherent*, and *Mr. Locke* *Primary*, and *Essential*, viz. *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Number*, *Situation*, *Motion*, or *Rest*, are no more than *Ideas*, or *Perceptions*, in us resulting from the *Textures* and *Frames* of their

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Subjects;

Subjects ; and that nothing more is meant by them than this, “ that
 “ the Subject exists under such a
 “ *Situation* of Parts, in Virtue of
 “ which we collect those *Ideas*, or
 “ affirm those particular *Qualities*
 “ of it, which are nothing more
 “ than the several Manners, under
 “ which the *Body* or *Object* presents itself to us, or in which we
 “ perceive Bodies, as to their *Modes*
 “ of *Existence* (b).”

§. XVII. But if this new Doctrine of *Qualities* should prove true, *this Gentleman* (by his own Confession) (i) has abated only the Force of that Part of Dr. *Clarke's* Argument, which depends on the Parallel of *Rotundity*, and *Consciousness* being an unjust one, from the Difference (no matter whether supposed or real)

(b) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 13.

(i) *Ibid.* pag. 15.

between a *Real, Inherent Quality*, and an *External Denomination*. Admitting therefore that he has proved this Distinction to be without any Difference; yet it does not follow from thence, that the Parallel is at all the more just: Neither has he touched that Part of the Argument, by which the *Doctor* proved to Demonstration, that every *Quality* of any whole System of Matter must be the *Sum* of the several *Qualities* of the different Parts: So that it still remains true, that *Consciousness* can no more be made up of Parts, that are severally unconscious, than *Rotundity* can, by a *Juxta Position* of *Streight Lines*, or a *Concert of Musick*, by a *Composition of Colours*.

§. XVIII. It will be to no Purpose, to reply to this, that the *Quality* of *Rotundity* affirmed of the Whole, is not the *Aggregate* of several *Rotundities*;

dities; for this signifies only, that a *Whole* is not made up of several *Wholes*; just in the same Manner as a *Society* or *Nation* is not made up of several *whole Societies* or *Nations*. But as we can retain no more in the *Idea* of a *Society*, or *Nation*, than a *Complex* of the *Individuals* that compose a *Society* or *Nation*; so we can mean no more by *Rotundity*, than a Combination of a Number of small, convex *Arches*, which constitute *Rotundity*.

§. XIX. Before Matter can be judged capable of Thinking, an approved Instance of a *Quality* must be given, which is no Composition of the *Qualities* of the several Parts, which make up the *Whole*; and till this is done, we have great Reason to conclude (according to our first Proposition) that *some Part of the Human Composition consists of Immaterial Substance*. But before

we

we proceed any further in this *Enquiry*, it will be necessary to consider more particularly, what is alleged to prove that the Distinction that is made between a *Real* and *Inherent Quality*, and an *Extrinsic Denomination* is without a Difference.

§. XX. In the Ingress to this Proof, the *Gentleman* I am disputing with sets out with a Definition of a *Quality*; (*k*) by a *Quality* (he says) is meant, *whatever may be predicated of any Substance, resulting from its Texture and Frame*: If this was true, indeed there would be no great Difficulty, in apprehending that all *Qualities* whatever are equally *Real*, as he endeavours to prove. For suppose a Body, or Piece of Matter of any given Texture; if all the *Qualities* that can be affirmed of

(*k*) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 8.

it, under that Situation of Parts depend upon that peculiar *Texture*, it must follow that none of them are *real*; because by a Variation of its *Texture*, the *Qualities* that might have been affirmed of that Substance before the Variation of its *Texture* must necessarily cease, and new ones be introduced. But this is so far from being true, that the contrary must necessarily appear to any one that shall attend to the following Proof.

§. XXI. It must be admitted, that Matter is a *solid, extended, and divisible Substance*; which *Qualities*, if they depended upon a peculiar *Texture*, or *Modification* of Parts (as our Author must suppose, if he would argue consistently with himself) must intirely cease under a different *Texture* of Parts. But no possible Composition can render any *Material Substance unsolid, unextended,*

tended, or indivisible: Nay the Possibility of the Variation of its *Texture* (which surely the *Gentleman* that I have to do with will not dispute against) necessarily implies its actual *Divisibility*. It follows therefore that there are *Qualities*, which may be predicated of a material Substance, which do not result from the *Texture* and *Frame* of the *Substance*; and that consequently this Definition of our *Author's* is a false one.

§. XXII. But it will be manifest to any one that shall deliberately attend to Mr. *Locke's* Explication of *Qualities*, notwithstanding it is said that *He has afforded much Occasion* (through *Inaccuracy, and want of clear Distinctions*) to perplex the *Understanding concerning Qualities*, (k) that he means by the *Bulk, Fi-*

(k) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 8.

gure, Number, Situation, Motion, and Rest of the solid Parts of Matter much the same as *this Gentleman* must mean by their *Texture* and *Modification*, so that these *Qualities* which Mr. *Locke* distinguishes by the Name of *Primary*, cannot ultimately depend upon the *Textures* of any Subjects ; for to say this, will in the Issue be to affirm that they depend upon themselves, which is an Absurdity. If there can be a different Meaning annexed to the Word *Texture*, let it be explained, so as to be contradistinguished from *Situation* in particular, and the Question will be given up.

§. XXIII. It will not at all abate the Force of this Argument, if our *Author* is in the right, in affirming that no *Quality* really inheres in the Subject of which it is predicated : Let it be admitted, that this

would be to consider a *Quality*, as a *real Being*; yet it by no means follows, that all *Qualities* are no more than *Perceptions* in us.

§. XXIV. The Truth of the Case seems to be this, that those *Qualities* only which we call *Sensible*, depend upon the *Texture* of their Subject: That is, that *Hardness* and *Softness*, *Heat* and *Cold*, all *Colours*, *Tastes*, and *Smells* (which stand referred to no *Patterns*, or *Resemblances in Nature*) are nothing but so many different *Perceptions* in us: It will be admitted there is nothing external which corresponds to them. But the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Number*, *Situation*, *Motion*, and *Rest* of the solid Parts of Matter stand referred to something else besides their respective *Ideas*; that is, a Body moves, or is at Rest, hath such a *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Situation*, &c. whether we perceive it or no.

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The *Idea* of Red, for instance, depends upon the superior *Bulk* of those *Rays of Light* which occasion it, and is no more than a *Perception* in us. But those *Rays of Light* which occasion the *Idea* of Red, are of such a *Bulk*, whether we perceive it or no. The Smell of a Rose again is nothing more than a peculiar Mode of *Perception*; but those *Effluvia*, or minute insensible Parts that raise the *Perception*, are of such a *Bulk*, *Situation*, and *Motion*, whether we perceive it or no. From whence it sufficiently appears, that the different *Textures* of the Parts of any System of Matter, as they can only occasion different *Modes* of *Perception* in intelligent Beings, can never constitute *Thought*, or *Intelligence* itself.

§. XXV. It will appear besides to any one, that will be at the Pains

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of comparing the *Philosophical Enquiry*, with Mr. *Locke's Essay on Human Understanding*, that the Exceptions, concerning the *Distinction of Qualities* are more against the Form, than the Power of Mr. *Locke's Reasoning* upon that Head. For the Absurdity that is imputed to Mr. *Locke* is, that he affirms the *Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, Motion, and Rest of the solid Parts of Matter* are so many real Beings, from this Supposition, that they are in the Subject, whether perceived or no: For if they were not real Beings, (says our Author) it would be impossible they could be in the Subject; since it would be very unphilosophical to say that that which has no real Being is in, or out of a Subject (1). But vary the Words of this Position of Mr. *Locke*; and instead of supposing that the *Bulk,*

(1) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 9.

Figure,

Figure, Situation, &c. of the Parts of Bodies are in the Bodies, whether we perceive them or no, substitute that *Bulk, Figure, Situation, &c.* are essential to all Matter, that is, that every material Substance consists of Parts of such a *Bulk* and *Situation*, that move or are at Rest, and are *solid and extended*, whether perceived or no; (for I take the Liberty of mentioning these two latter *Qualities*, tho' they were industriously omitted by our Author, as being the least liable to Exception) change, I say, the Terms, *are in the Subject*, to these, *that they are essential to the Subject*, and the real Difference between *Primary* and *Secondary Qualities* will remain free from any Objection, that hath been made against the Possibility of such a Distinction.

§. XXVI. And that there must be a Difference between *Primary* and *Secondary Qualities* (I think) can remain a Question with no rational Enquirer; especially since it hath been shewn that there are *Qualities* of Matter which are inseparable from the Subject, under all possible *Divisions*, or *Modifications* of the Subject. But if this should still be a Matter of Doubt; the following Observations from the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* will perfectly clear it up. (m)

“ Take a grain of Wheat, and divide it into two Parts, and each Part has still *Solidity, Extension, Figure, and Mobility*: Divide it again, and it still retains the same *Qualities*: And so divide it on till the Parts become insensible, they must still retain each

(m) Mr. *Locke's* Essay concerning *Human Understanding*, Book II. Chap. VIII. Sect. 9.

“ of them all those *Qualities*. For
 “ Division, which is all that a Mill,
 “ or a Pestel, or any other Body
 “ does upon another, in reducing
 “ it to insensible Parts, can never
 “ take away either *Solidity*, *Exten-*
 “ *sion*, *Figure*, or *Mobility* from any
 “ Body ; but only makes two or
 “ more distinct separate Masses of
 “ that which was but one before.”

And again the same Author says
 in another Place, (n) “ Pound an
 “ Almond, and the clear white
 “ Colour will be altered into a dirty
 “ one, and the sweet Taste into
 “ an oily one, but what real Alte-
 “ ration can the beating of a Pestel
 “ make in any Body, but an Alte-
 “ ration in the *Texture* of it ?” And
 I may justly add, what can the
 Alteration in the *Texture* of any
 Body produce more than a Change
 of *Ideas* in us ?

(n) Essay concerning *Human Understanding*,
 Book II. Chap. V. Sect. 20.

§. XXVII. This being settled, we may with the more Ease and Perspicuity undertake a Refutation of what *our Author* has said to establish the Truth of his second Proposition than would otherwise have been possible in a Question of such Intricacy, and difficult Decision.

§. XXVIII. His second Proposition is, *that it appears most evidently from the Nature of Cogitation, that Matter is the Subject of it.*

His Reasoning for which is to this Effect : (o) That as we have different *Ideas* at different Times, and as the Mind is almost constantly gaining new *Ideas*, and ceasing to retain several others which it had before, if this Variation, or Change of *Ideas* is incompatible with the Unchangeableness of the Subject (as no Substance but Matter is change-

(o) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 17.

able) it follows that material Substance must be the *Subject* of *Cogitation*. And that a Variation, or Change of *Ideas* is incompatible with the Unchangeableness of the Subject, may be demonstrated (he says) by the following Propositions.

(p) First, That *every Quality that can be affirmed of any Subject must necessarily be the Result of the Texture and Frame of the Subject*: For if it were not, (q) then a *Quality might exist independently of its Subject*; which is an Absurdity.

Secondly, That while the Subject continues exactly in the same Texture and Frame, *it can neither acquire any new Qualities, nor cease to retain any that it had before*; which must be true (he says) because if it was not, a *Subject would*

(p) *Philosophical Enquiry*, page 18.

(q) *Ibid.* pag. 20.

continue in the same Texture and Frame, and not in the same Texture, and Frame at the same Time; which is a Contradiction.

Thirdly, If every new *Idea* is a new *Quality*, and every *Idea* which the Mind ceases to retain the Loss of a *Quality*; then it must follow (as we are informed) from the second Proposition, that the *new Quality* acquired, or the *old one lost*, can be occasioned by nothing, but an Alteration in the Subject, (*r*) and that consequently, *Matter* must be the Subject of *Cogitation*.

§. XXIX. This is the Substance of this Gentleman's Argument under this Head; to which I return the following Answer.

First, That no *Qualities*, or Attributes that can be affirmed of any Substance, can result from its *Tex-*

(*r*) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 21.

ture, or Frame. (s) Effects indeed may be produced on foreign Substances, by the *Texture*, and *Situation* of the Parts of any particular Substance; as the *Sun* by the *Texture* and *Motion* of its Parts melts Wax, hardens Clay, or raises the *Perceptions* of *Light* and *Heat* in us. But these Effects produced are no *Qualities* of the *Sun*; but only new *Modes* of the *thinking Substance*, or new *Modifications* of external Bodies, occasioned by the *Sun*.

§. XXX. But how it follows if *Qualities, or Attributes* did not result from the *Texture and Frame* of those Subjects of which they are predicated, that then they must *exist independently of their Subjects*, I have not the least Conception of: For it should rather be a Consequence, upon an Admission that a

(s) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 21.

Quality results from the *Texture* and *Frame* of its Subject, that it must *exist independently of its Subject*. It appears therefore, that *our Author* has drawn an Absurdity from the Supposition of the Falseness of the first Proposition, which follows unavoidably upon the Supposition of the Truth of it. For it is very difficult to apprehend, that a *Quality* depending only for its Existence upon the *Frame* of a Subject, yet cannot exist *independently* of its Subject: But as no *Quality* can exist independently of its Subject, it is a necessary Consequence, that it must of the peculiar *Frame* and *Texture* of its Subject.

§. XXXI. But if *this Gentleman* had seriously intended to convince his Readers, more than to puzzle and confound them, he would have proved first of all, that what thinks

has any *Texture*, or *Frame*: for the Terms *Texture*, and *Frame*, (I imagine) are not with any Consistency applicable to an *immaterial Substance*; and that it has any *Texture*, or *Frame*, will not (as I presume) follow the allowing that we *think differently, at different Times*.

§. XXXII. That the Subject of Cogitation is almost *constantly gaining Ideas, that it had not some time before, and ceasing to retain those that it had*, may be granted, without any Prejudice to Truth; but that this cannot be done, without some Variation in the Subject, will not follow, any more than it will follow that a *diaphanous Body* cannot (without undergoing some Change in the Situation of its Parts) transmit more *Rays of Light* at one Time than at another, or none at all; according to the near-

er, or further Position, or total Absence of a *luminous Body*; or that a Vessel cannot at different Times, under one *identical Texture* of Parts, be the *Receptacle* of different Liquors.

§. XXXIII. The various Organs which are the *Avenues*, through which all *sensible Qualities* are conveyed to us, may have different *Modifications*, in Proportion to the *Difference of Perception*; but what perceives remains unalterable. The *Rays of Light*, for Instance, which are differently reflected, according to the different *Arrangement* of the superficial Parts of external Bodies, may cause different Motions in the *Organ of Sight*, or the Eye, which is the *Medium of Perception*, may be differently agitated, according to the *Difference of those Rays* which strike upon it: But the *Mind* which perceives different *I-*

deas, or *Colours*, in Vertue of the different Motions impressed on the *Eye*, remains without any Variation, or Change.

§. XXXIV. Change of *Ideas* in a thinking Substance no more infers the *Discernibility* of that Substance, than the Unchangeableness of the *Qualities* of a material one infers its *Indiscernibility*; and that there are *Qualities*, nay that all the *Qualities* of a material Substance, which are properly called so, can never cease under any Difference of the Situation of its Parts, has been already proved (*t*) in the Instances of *Solidity*, *Extension*, and *Divisibility*, which are inseparable from the Subject under any *Divisions*, *Compositions*, or *Modifications* whatever. And if a Body is solid, and extended under one given *Modification*, or

(*t*) *Vide supra*, Pages 22 and 29.

Texture of its Parts ; and solid, and extended under another ; why may not the thinking Substance have different *Ideas*, while it remains unalterably the same ? For as the Permanency of the *Qualities* of the one infers not that it is *unchangeable*, neither does the Alteration of the *Modes* of *Thinking* in the other infer that it is *changeable*.

§. XXXV. But the same Argument that will prove a thinking Substance *changeable*, will prove a *solid* one *unchangeable*, which is against Matter of Fact, common Sense, and the constant Experience of our Senses. For according to *our Author*, every particular *Quality* depends upon one peculiar *Texture* of its Subject ; and must cease under a Change of that *Texture*. Let us try, therefore, the Force of these notable Principles ; and if setting out from such Pre-

mises will not lead him into the following Maze of Contradictions, I am much mistaken.

For, *Solidity* is a *Quality* inseparable from Matter.

But, no *Quality* is inseparable from a *changeable Substance*.

Therefore, Matter is *unchangeable*.

Or which is worse, by the same Method of Ratiocination it may be proved that a Substance may be *divisible* and *indivisible* at the same Time.

For, *Divisibility* is a *Quality* inseparable from Matter.

But, no *Quality* is inseparable from a *divisible Substance*.

Therefore, Matter is *indivisible*: That is, what is divisible is indivisible.

§. XXXVI. *This Gentleman* (as I imagine) has been led into this Mistake, that a Change of *Ideas* in the thinking Substance infers a Variation in the Substance itself, from observing that no *sensible Qualities* are altered any otherwise than in consequence of new, and different *Modifications*; which is simlizing Things that have no Comparison at all. It is impossible indeed that any external Body, under one and the same *Situation*, or *Arrangement* of its superficial Parts, should convey to me the different *Ideas* of *Blue* and *Red*, *Rough* and *Smooth*; but it is no Consequence at all that therefore I, that is what thinks, should undergo any Alteration, at the *Perception* of those different *Ideas*.

§. XXXVII. From what has been said hitherto upon this Subject, the intelligent

intelligent Reader may (I presume) gather sufficient Reason to conclude, that Thought cannot result from Matter, however *modified* or *disposed*: Since all the *Qualities* of any Material Substance being no more than the *Sums*, or *Aggregates* of the *Qualities* of the different Parts of that Substance, Thinking in like Manner (supposing it a *Quality* of Matter) must be the *Aggregate* of the Thoughts of the different Parts of the thinking Substance; which is confessedly contradictory and absurd ; and since it has been shewn, that *our Author's* Observations on Dr. *Clarke's* and Mr. *Locke's* Distinction of *Qualities* are without any Foundation in Reason and Philosophy: But more especially, as his Attempt to prove from the *Nature of Cogitation*, that *Matter is the Subject of it* must lead him into the Contradiction of supposing Matter *changeable* and
unchangeable

unchangeable, divisible and indivisible at the same Time.

§. XXXVIII. I might with Reason therefore leave this Question for the impartial Reader to determine, on which Side the greater Strength of Argument lies: But I had rather seem tedious, than let any Thing slip, that may be serviceable in clearing up a Point of such Importance and Significancy. I shall therefore, in the Conclusion of this Division, lay before the Reader, in as short and concise a Manner as I can, what to me seemed always convincing, that the *thinking Substance* must be *immaterial*.

§. XXXIX. And this will appear from the Nature of *Consciousness*, by which I mean that *Power* of the Mind, by which I know that my Actions and Thoughts are my own, and not another's. That the
Mind

Mind has such a *Power*, and that it knows the Actions done twenty Years ago, were done by that Being that hath now the *Consciousness*; that it did it, must be granted; or else it will follow that such a Being is now *conscious* of doing Actions which it never did; which is manifestly absurd, if our Definition of *Consciousness* is allowed a just one; for it is inconceivable that I should be *conscious* of doing that which I never did, if *Consciousness* is a *Power* of knowing that my Actions are my own, and not another's.

§. XL. This being premised, it may be demonstrated that *Consciousness* cannot be a *Quality*, or *Power* of Matter from the following Propositions.

First, That no one identical and the same *Quality* can be affirmed of two or more different Substances; which

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which must be true: For that the *Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, and Consciousness* of one Body can be the *Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, and Consciousness* of another is utterly impossible.

Secondly, That all Matter is liable to constant Variation and Change; which is manifest, and disputed by none. — But I have no Occasion to enlarge upon this; because it becomes particularly the *darling Principle* of our *Author*, and indeed almost the only one he has laid down that is incontestible.

§. XLI. If the first Proposition is true, it follows, that no Substance which is liable to constant Variation and Change can be the Subject of this *Power*; for if it can, then the *identical and same Power*, called *Consciousness*, may be affirmed of different Substances; for suppose

pose a Body, or Mass of Matter, of Fifty or Five Hundred Parts, and make it the *Subject* of *Consciousness*; the Power must cease upon the withdrawing of any of the Parts from the whole Mass, and the adding of other Parts; or else it must be affirmed of different Substances: Which has been shewn to be an Absurdity.

It follows therefore, if no Substance which is liable to Variation and Change, can be the Subject of *Consciousness*, that (according to the second Proposition) Matter cannot be the Subject of it; because Matter is liable to constant Variation and Change.

§. XLII. This Consequence, (to use our Author's Words, tho' with some Variation) (u) *Is not only to be deduced from a strictly argumen-*

(u) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 23.

tative Enquiry; but from the Constancy, and Unchangeableness of *Consciousness*, so little agreeing with the *Nature of Matter*, which seems to be always in Motion, and Shifting, and Varying its Modification. Neither in Reality can the *Unchangeableness* of *Consciousness* be accounted for rationally upon any other Principle than that of the *Unchangeableness* of the Subject of *Consciousness*, and of its Immateriality, which is consequent to it. (w) I am entirely persuaded that I am the same Person now that I was twenty Years ago; the *Essence* therefore of that which properly constitutes my *Personality* cannot be of a

(w) Ipsum esse Illum quoque nunc, qui fuit tunc, est firmissima mentis ejus Conceptio: Hujusmodi ergo Essentia ejus, non est Complexio, quæ ab illo Tempore forsitan est plusquam millies permutata.

Raimundus Martini.

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compounded Nature, or *material*, for if it was, it would probably from that Time have undergone a thousand Alterations. But it is inconceivable and impossible that the Constancy and Identity of *Consciousness* can consist with an Alteration of the Subject of it.

§. XLIII. But I would caution the Reader not to mistake my Meaning in this Place; it may possibly otherwise happen that my asserting that the Identity of *Consciousness* cannot be preserved but by the Identity of the Subject of it, may seem inconsistent with what I have laid down in another Place, (*) where it is said, that all the *Qualities* of Matter (which are properly called so) are invariable, or cannot cease under any Variation of the Substance, in the Instances of *Solidity*, *Extension*,

(*) Vide pag. 38.

... which are inseparable from Matter: From whence these disadvantageous Consequences may be drawn; that if those *Qualities* remain invariable, under any Variation of the *Subject*, *Consciousness* (in like Manner) may be preserved the same, under any Change of the Subject, and consequently, that all that hath been said under that Head, is fruitless and insignificant.

§. XLIV. But it is not to be understood that I should mean that the *identical Solidity, Extension*, &c. of one Parcel of Matter, could be the *identical Solidity, Extension*, &c. of another, (when I said that those *Attributes*, or *Qualities* were invariable, or could not be changed) but only this, that they were *essential* to all Matter; that is, vary Matter as you please, take any of the Parts from any *Composition*, and add others, it would be still *solid*,

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and *extended*; not that the *Solidity*, or *Extension*, before the *Subtraction* of any of the Parts from the *Sum*, and the *Addition* of other Parts, was the same as after, or that the *Solidity* of one Parcel of Matter was the *Solidity* of another. Thus one thinking Substance cannot have the *numerical Consciousness* of another; but as the thinking Substance in me has that *numerical Consciousness* now that it had ten or twenty Years ago, it is a necessary Consequence that it must be *numerically* the same.

§. XLV. But secondly, admitting the *intelligent Principle* in Man is only Matter fitly disposed, yet it does not follow from thence, or from any Thing else, that *this Gentleman* has said, that Man is incapable of *Liberty*, or may not have a *Power* of beginning, stopping, and directing *Motion*.

§. XLVI. One might indeed with more Ease undertake a Refutation of the Arguments brought in on the Side of *Necessity*, from the Establishment of the Principle I have already defended: But let it be granted, that *Thinking*, *Willing*, and *Resolving*, are *Qualities* of material Substances; yet it is no necessary Consequence that Freedom, or a self-motive Power, may not be affirmed of such Substances. The Notion that Man is no more than a Piece of Mechanism may be grafted upon that Stock; but the Stock (of itself) is not naturally productive of such Fruit: It may be a Kind of Foster-Father, to nurse and countenance the Principles that spring up in the Course of this *Gentleman's Enquiry*, which may draw some small Nutrition from thence; but would starve upon any other Bottom: Yet admit-

ting that we are no more than *Ter-ræ Filii*, or *Sons of the Earth*, and that the thinking Substance is of material Extraction only ; yet it is emancipated, or set free from the *Laws* of Matter.

§. XLVII. But the exceeding Difficulty *our Author* must labour under (in Conjunction with Mr. *Hobbs*, *Spinoza*, and the Rest of the Contenders against *human Liberty*) is, that in almost the same Breath, He must consider Matter capable of unknown *Powers*, in the Instances of *Thinking*, *Willing*, &c. and then must reduce it to mere Matter again, incapable of moving Bodies any otherwise than by *Impulse and Contact*. These *Gentlemen* would lament one's Want of Genius and Comprehension, in Questions of this Nature, if it is said that it is impossible to conceive Matter capable of *Thinking* ; but
heartily

heartily concur with the Opinion, that all the Operations of Matter are *necessary* and *mechanical*: But if a Parcel of Matter, under a peculiar *Texture* and *Modification*, may have the Quality of Thinking, there can be no good Reason assigned, why it may not have that of *Spontaneity*; as shall be fully shewn under this second Division.

§. XLVIII. In following the Subject under this Head, it will be necessary to consider First, What is meant by the Terms *Liberty*, *Freedom*, or *Spontaneity*: For till the precise *Idea* is settled, of which those Words are significant, it will be impossible to determine, with any Consistency, concerning a Question of such Niceness, as that we are at present in Pursuit of.

§. XLIX. Our constant Experience of the Alteration of the *sensible Qualities* of Bodies without, by the Operation of Bodies that are external, furnishes us with the *Idea* of *Power*; for wherever a Change is effected in any Thing, the Mind naturally conceives in Something a Power to make that Change. For Instance, when an Alteration is made in the Consistency of *Gold*, by the Application of *Fire* to that Substance, we conceive that there is a *Power* in the *Fire* to make that Alteration: Or when a Body that was at Rest, is put into Motion by the *Trusion* of another Body in Motion, we have an *Idea* of a *Power* in the Body in Motion to move the Body at Rest. But no Body *associates* with this *Idea* of *Power* any Circumstances of *Agency* or *Freedom* in the Cause; for *Liberty* consists in the Production

tion of any Effect, which does not depend upon a Continuation of *Passion* in the Cause, (as is manifestly the Case of a Body in Motion, which communicates Motion to a Body at Rest) — but upon the Beginning of Action; and the *Idea* of it arises only from a Reflection upon what passes within our own Minds, when we act.

§. L. By *Liberty* and *Freedom* then is meant, that *Power* which a thinking Being, as such, has to act, or not to act, according to its own Determination, unacted upon by any Thing from within or without: And the only conceivable Ways in which a Restraint can be put upon *human Liberty*, are either when the Man moves or acts *mechanically*, or when he is acted upon by the *Impulse* of some other Body.

§. LI. *Mechanical Motion* or Action, (according to our Author) is produced (y) “ From those *physical Causes* which result from the “ very Being and Constitution of “ Man, by which some Constitu- “ ent Parts of his Frame *necessa- “ rily*, and according to the *Laws* “ of *Mechanism*, act upon, and “ move the other Parts, so as to “ produce the Effect.”

§. LII. Motion by *Impulse* and *Contact* is (I imagine) sufficiently understood, and needs no Explanation. So far then as a *thinking Being* produces any Effect unacted upon by any Thing from without and free from any *mechanical* Operation from within, so far such a Being is at absolute Liberty.

(y) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 50.

§. LIII

§. LIII. One who is acted upon from without, and carried from Place to Place, by a Force superior to his own, is what we may call *necessitated*: And one who has convulsive Motions in his Arms, which make him strike and wound those who come near him, is, in that Instance, under a *mechanical Operation*, which he can no more stop than he can those of the Circulation of his Blood, or Beating of his Pulse. And to proceed upon our Author's Hypothesis, if that Change of *Texture* which a *thinking Substance* (supposing it *material*) must undergo, in Order for the Production of any new Action, is in the same Sense *mechanical*, or if such a Change is effected by Bodies extraneous, the *thinking Substance* is under an absolute Necessity. But if such a Substance, or Being, can spontaneously produce that Change of

of *Texture*, which is necessary for the Production of any new Action, it is free in the highest Import and Signification of that Word.

§. LIV. Having thus explained what is meant by the Terms *Liberty*, or *Freedom*, I shall proceed to shew the Inconclusiveness of what our *Author* has advanced to prove that the Variety of Actions, and Motions, in *sensible Beings*, can be no Effects of *Liberty* or *Choice*.

§. LV. *This Gentleman* introduces his Argument upon this Subject, and thinks to add *Strength* to it, by pointing out the *Weakness* of what hath been offered upon this Question, in the *Essay concerning human Understanding*: Where Mr. *Locke* (in Order to confute those who denied the Possibility of a Creation, from the Difficulty there

was of conceiving the Modus of such an Operation) has observed, that the Difficulty of apprehending how it could be done, was no Argument against the Possibility of such an Act of Omnipotence. —

“ For we do not, (says he) deny other Effects upon this Ground, because we cannot conceive the Manner of their Production, we cannot conceive how any Thing but the *Impulse* of Body can move Body ; but this is no Reason sufficient to make us conclude that nothing else can, against the constant Experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our *voluntary Motions*, which cannot be the Effects of the *Impulse* of Matter in or upon our Bodies ; for then it would not be in our Power to alter it. For Example, my Right Hand writes, whilst my Left Hand is at Rest ; what causes Rest in the one, and Motion

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“ in the other? Nothing but my
 “ *Will*, a *Thought* of my Mind;
 “ my *Thought* only changing my
 “ Right Hand rests, and the Left
 “ Hand moves,” &c. (z)

§. LVI. What is advanced by
 Mr. *Locke* in this Quotation, our
 Author takes the Liberty of com-
 paring with what he delivers in his
Chapter of Power; where it is said,
 “ That as the *Will* is one *Power* or
 “ *Ability*, and *Freedom* another *Power*
 “ *er* or *Ability*; to ask whether the
 “ *Will* is *free*, is to ask whether one
 “ *Power* has another *Power*, a *Questi-*
 “ on too grossly absurd to need an
 “ Answer: For *Powers* belong on-
 “ ly to *Agents*, or *Substances*; and
 “ to ask whether the *Will* is free,
 “ is to ask whether the *Will* is a
 “ *Substance* (a).”

(z) Mr. *Locke*'s Essay, Book IV. Chap. X.
 Sect. 19.

(a) Vide Mr. *Locke*'s Chap. Of *Power*, Sect. 16.

§. LVII.

§. LVII. From the Comparison of these different Quotations, the following Contradiction is imputed to Mr. *Locke*, that in one Place he makes the *Will* the *Agent*, or *Subject* itself, and has considered it as the Cause of Action, and in another has reduced it to a meer *Power* incapable of any *Action* or *Causality*.

§. LVIII. Our Author therefore concludes, that as *Thought*, or the *Will*, are only *meer Powers*, they can have no Power to cause either Motion or Rest in Bodies; (b) since that would be to affirm, (in Mr. *Locke's* Words) *one Power, or Ability of another Power, or Ability, an Affirmation too grossly absurd to need an Answer: For who is there that sees not that Powers belong only*

(b) *Philosophical Enquiry*, page 28.

to Agents, and are Attributes of Substances, and not of Powers themselves?

§. LIX. Thinking, Willing, and Resolving therefore, (as *this Gentleman* immediately subjoins) can no more act upon Body than Length, Breadth, or Thickness can, and soon after, (c) *Thinking can no more be the Cause of Action, or Motion, in a Body, than the particular Colour of a Bowl can be the Cause of its Motion:* And in another Place, Thought, or Intelligence, are only meer Attributes or Qualities of a Subject; (d) and are therefore no more capable of being the Causes of the physical Motions of a Body, than Nothing is capable of producing Something.

(c) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 30.

(d) *Ibid.* pag. 44.

§. LX.

§. LX. I am not particularly interested in the Defence of Mr. Locke; but it may be supposed that one of his vast Comprehension and Genius, could not mean that the Attributes of *Thought* and *Volition* were Agents, when he said that his *Will*, or *Thought*, determined his Right Hand to write, and his Left Hand to rest, or any Thing more than this, that his Mind determined, or acted *freely* in this Respect, in Consequence of its having those Attributes of *Thought* and *Volition*; just in the same Manner as when one affirms that a Body interposed (in Virtue of its having the Attribute of *Solidity*, or *Impenetrability*) will hinder two other Bodies from touching; not that the Solidity of the Body is any Hindrance in the Case, or that a *Power* or *Attribute* merely is capable of Action or Causality.

§. LXI.

§. LX.

§. LXI. But (if I may take the same Liberty with our *Author*, as he has with Mr. *Locke*) it will be necessary to compare what is said in other Parts of *his Enquiry*, with what is advanced above; *No Body at Rest* (he tells us) *can be acted upon so as to be put into Motion, but by the physical Impulse and Contact of some other Body*; (e) and that *Body which has not been acted upon by Impulse and Contact, must still continue in the same Frame.* (f) From whence it appears how very consistent *this Gentleman* is in his Reasoning upon this Subject, and how exactly this *tallies* with his Explication of the Incapacity of *Qualities*, and with what he before established, concerning the Impropriety of attributing Effects to *Pow-*

(e) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 37.

(f) *Ibid.* pag. 38.

ers or *Qualities*; For if the meer *Qualities* or *Attributes* of any Subject are no more capable of being the *Causes* of *Motion*, than Nothing is capable of producing Something, Impulse and Contact (which are only *Qualities* of Substances) can no more act upon Bodies, than *Thought* or *Volition*, or than *Length*, *Breadth*, or *Thickness*.

§. LXII. By the same Method then that he proves a thinking Being, as such, can't move itself by *Thought* and *Volition*, it will appear that a solid Substance, as such, can't move Bodies by *Impulse* and *Contact*. For Impulse and Contact being only *Predicables* of Substances, and not Substances themselves, can no more operate in the Production of any Effect than *Thought* or *Volition*; since nothing can act but Substance. To affirm then that the Actions and Motions of Bodies,

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may depend upon the *Impulse* and *Contact* of other Bodies, will amount to as gross an Absurdity as is imputed to Mr. *Locke*, in that Instance of his attributing *the Motion of his Right Hand, and the Rest of his Left, to the Will or Thought of his Mind.*

§. LXIII. But how very odd and inconsistent is it in *this Gentleman*, to bring in Mr. *Locke* as guilty of an Absurdity, in attributing an Effect to Thought and Volition, and soon after (in a Quotation from the same Author) to let a like Instance of a Contradiction pass with his Approbation? For in order to prove that whatever has the *Power* of Impulse must be *solid* and *material*, he repeats from Mr. *Locke*, that *upon the Solidity of Bodies depend their mutual Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion: The whole of which, he judiciously remarks, is self-evident;* (g) that

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(g) that is, *an Affirmation too grossly absurd to need an Answer*, is self-evident: *For who is there that sees not, that Powers belong only to Agents, and are Attributes of Substances, and not of Powers themselves?* For Solidity being one *Power*, or *Ability*; and Resistance, Impulse, and Protrusion other *Powers*; to affirm that Resistance, Impulse, and Protrusion depend upon Solidity, is to affirm; that one *Power* or *Attribute* depends upon *another*. Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion therefore must depend upon the *Body* itself, and not upon the *Solidity* of the Body, if Solidity is only a meer *Power*.

§. LXIV. It is true indeed, that whatever is solid has the Properties of *Impulse*, *Resistance*, and *Protrusion*, or a *Power* of communicating Motion to other Bodies, being first

(g) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 40.

moved itself: But the Association, or
 Coexistence of these Qualities, is in-
 ferred only from Experience; and
 we may with equal Consistence af-
 firm, that whatever has Thought and
 Volition, can move itself *spontane-*
ously, in virtue of its possessing those
Properties of Thought and Volition.
 Mr. *Locke* therefore must be under-
 stood to attribute the Motion of his
 Right Hand, and the Rest of his
 Left, to the *Will* or *Thought* of his
 Mind, in no other Sense than our
 Author does the *mutual Impulse* of
 Bodies to their *respective Solidity.*
 And if a Thinking Being can move
 itself in consequence and in virtue
 of its possessing the *Powers of Thought*
 and *Volition*, that, I imagine, is a
 sufficient Indication of its not being
 under a *Mechanical* and *Physical* In-
 fluence; but of its possessing in the
 highest Degree that *Power*, which is
 the *Essence* of, and constitutes (what
 we call) *Liberty* or *Freedom.*

§. LXV. The Difficulty of conceiving, how one by a Thought of his Mind can give Motion to the Parts of his Body, is (I confess) insurmountable; and while that alone exercises our Thoughts, it may drive us into a contrary Opinion, which is attended with equal Difficulty; they being the *Scylla* and *Charybdis*, in either of which our Understandings will be lost; they are Points which seem removed beyond our Ken; and it will be as vain to undertake an Explication of either *Hypothesis*, as to deny Matters of Fact which we cannot account for. For I would ask any one, whether he has a clearer Conception of the Manner in which Motion is produced by *Impulse*, than of the Manner in which it is produced by *Thought* or *Volition*. It is evident, that Motion may be an Effect of either Cause: This is Matter of Fact, the Truth of which is

afforded us by daily Experience; but the Manner in which either Cause operates is hid in impenetrable Obscurity. There is as little conceivable Connection between the *Impulse* of a Body in Motion, and the *Motion* of a Body that was at Rest, as there is between *Thought* and *voluntary Motion*; that the one infers the other can be argued only from Experience; for the Cause of the Co-existence of these Qualities, the *Power of Impulse*, and the *Power of communicating Motion* to a Body at Rest (as well as of *Thought* and *Voluntary Motion*) is utterly unknown.

§. LXVI. It is exactly the same in all the *Mechanical Affections* of Bodies (they having no Affinity at all with the Effects they produce;) so that it is impossible to learn that the one infers the other, from any abstract Consideration of the Things themselves, and without any experimental

mental Knowledge. Let any one endeavour to explain the Connection, or the Cause of the Coexistence of the Impulses of the *Effluvia* of a Rose upon the different Organs of the *Nose* and *Eye*, and of the Perceptions that are raised in us of its *Colour* and *Smell*; and he will soon find, that it surpasses his Abilities even to attain to the remotest and most glimmering Perception of it; the most rational Account of all which, is, that *they are the Effects of the continued Operation of the All-wise Architect upon us*; and that those Perceptions result from their Objects in no other Sense, than as those Objects are Mediums of Perception, under his Guidance and Direction.

§. LXVII. When we say, that a Body of a peculiar Texture and Configuration of Parts will produce in us the *Ideas* of a particular *Colour*, *Taste*, and *Smell*, our Understandings

trace these Effects no farther than to their *second Causes*; or, if any one would go higher, he must resolve them into the *Cause of all Things*, whose *Ways*, as they are not our *Ways*, so neither are they limited to our Comprehension. And when we say, that a Body in Motion will communicate Motion to a Body at Rest; we conceive no more than the *Passage of Motion out of one Body into another*, where that Body that communicates the Motion, loses as much as it gives: which is as obscure and inconceivable, as the Communication of Motion by Thought (b).

§. LXVIII. From hence will appear the Vanity of contesting for the *Clearness* of one side of the Question, by shewing the *Obscurity* of the other; and the mean Triumph of

(b) Vide Mr. Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book II. Chap. XXIII. Sect. 28.

that Reasoning, which arises from a partial View of one Opinion only, whilst each (upon Enquiry) will be found clogged with Objections, that will equally bar the Reception of both,

§. LXVIX. From what has been said, it is manifest, that our Author (in *undermining Mr. Locke*) has (by a strange Dexterity) *sapt that Foundation* upon which he *builds* his own Philosophy. But Peace be with the Ashes of the *great Author* of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, since nothing from this Quarter can *hurt* him, but what will *recoil* with equal Force against his Adversary, and since those very Principles which *our Author renounces* in assailing him, are *admitted* in Defence of himself.

§. LXX. But to return to the Argument. Let it be admitted, that all

all the different Actions of Thinking Substances, and even Difference of *Ideas* themselves, are Effects only of different *Modifications* and *Changes* of the Substances; yet this will not prove, that all Actions are *necessary* and *mechanical*, till it is shewn, that the Mind can have no Power to change itself: Supposing that Thought, and the Resolution to do any Thing, and the consequent Action, must necessarily result from some *Change* in the Mind, and that if the Mind had continued in that Frame it was in before such a Resolution was formed, it would have been impossible for it to have made the Resolution; it will not follow, that the Resolution or Action is necessary (in that Sense our Author would be understood to convey to his Readers) till he has proved that the *Alteration* of the Mind itself must be *physical* and *necessary*. If
then,

then, as hath been said above (i),
*the Mind can spontaneously produce
 that Change of Texture in itself which
 is necessary for the Production of any
 new Action, it is absolutely free.*

§. LXXI. The Action indeed may
 necessarily result from such a
 Change; in which Sense all Actions
 whatever are necessary; but this is
 only a *consequential Necessity*. Thus
 the Motion of the Fingers over the
 various Keys of any Musical Instru-
 ment, is necessarily caused by a pe-
 culiar Disposition of the Muscles of
 his Arms and Fingers who plays
 upon it; that by a peculiar Motion
 of the *animal Spirits*; this by a
 particular Modification of the *Brain*;
 supposing that the *cogitative Sub-
 stance*; and in every Gradation of
 these Causes, the Effects will be al-
 lowed necessary, except the Motion

(i) *Vide supra*, Page 57, and 58.

of the *Brain*, which is *self-formed* (for all that our Author has said to the contrary) and consequently the thinking Substance is entirely free, if it has no *physical* and *mechanical Cause* of that Motion, and is not acted upon by something *from without* : And that it has no physical and mechanical Cause of that Motion, and is not acted upon by something external, this Gentleman is so kind as to leave us at full Liberty to imagine, as will appear from a View of his Reasoning on this Head; which consists in an Attempt to prove that all the Actions and Motions of Bodies must depend on the two following Principles :

First, *Upon the Physical and Mechanical Laws and Powers of the Bodies themselves that are in Motion;*
Or,

Secondly,

Secondly, *Upon the Impulse or Contact of some other Bodies (k).*

§. LXXII. The Motion of Bodies, which results from the *Physical and Mechanical Laws and Powers* of the Bodies themselves, is that Species of Motion which is supposed *essential* to Matter: (l) but as the Proof of this first Principle is rested upon the Establishment of the second, it will be necessary to consider what is offered to establish the Truth of that.

§. LXXIII. *No Body (we are told) which is at perfect Rest (supposing that to be possible) can put itself into Motion, or give itself a new Direction when in Motion, without undergoing some physical Change, or being acted upon physically by something*

(k) *Vide Philosophical Enquiry, pag. 33.*

(l) *Ibid. pag. 34.*

external

external to it. (m) For if it could, then more or less Attributes could be affirmed of the same Body at different Points of Time, and yet the Frame and Texture of the Body itself continue exactly the same, which is impossible (n).

§. LXXIV. It remains therefore (according to this Gentleman) to be proved, that *no Body at Rest* (supposing that to be possible) *can be acted upon, so as to be put into Motion, by any thing but the physical Impulse or Contact of some other Body*; which is said to be done in the Method that follows (o).

§. LXXV. *That only which hath the Power of Impulse and Contact can act upon or affect Body, so as to*

(m) *Vide Philosophical Enquiry, pag. 35.*

(n) *Ibid. pag. 36.*

(o) *Ibid. pag. 37, 38, and 39.*

put it into Motion : Why ? Because That which has undergone no Change or Alteration in its Texture and Frame, no new Quality or Attribute can be affirmed of : And that Body which hath not been acted upon by Impulse and Contact, must still continue in the same Texture and Frame, and consequently, if it was at Rest before, it must be so still ; because Motion would be a new Quality acquired ; which is impossible in a Subject that hath undergone no physical Alteration or Change.

§. LXXVI. I could wish the Clearness of this Reasoning was (in any measure) answerable to the Depth of it. I confess, it is with some Difficulty that I can fix a Meaning to the Terms *Physical Change*, sufficient for the Foundation of an Answer. But I imagine, our Author must intend (in his first *Postulatum*) by a Body's undergoing some Physical Change, either

either that Change of Situation (in the first Place) which is inferred from its putting itself into Motion; or, secondly, that Change of Texture, which he supposes natural and *essential* to all Bodies, from the *uncommunicated Motion* that he talks of.

§. LXXVII. If we take his Meaning according to the first of these Constructions, it will certainly be granted, that no Body can put itself into Motion, without undergoing some *Change*; according to the Truth of those eminent Axioms in Philosophy, *Whatever is, is*; and, *It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be*. For it is as impossible for any Body to move, without changing its Situation, as it is for it to change its Situation without moving. The Propositions (as I apprehend) are *identical*, and the linking them together in the Form of an Argument,

will

will amount to a Proof of this great Truth, that *'tis impossible for a Body to move whilst it is at Rest*. If the second Construction best comports with his Meaning, it will follow, that no Body whatever can put itself into Motion; it being as impossible for that which never can rest, to put itself into Motion, as it is for that which never can move, to put itself into Rest. For when a Body puts itself into Motion, there is implied (in the very Terms) a Transition from something that was *opposite*; which is impossible, if it is a Contradiction to suppose any Body at Rest. But it is absolutely improper to affirm, *that no Body can put itself into Motion, without being acted upon physically by something external*; for that would be no better Sense, than to affirm, that no Body *could* put itself into Motion, but what is put into Motion; which is an Absurdity that carries with it its own Conviction.

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§. LXXVIII.

§. LXXVIII. But supposing that Change our Author means is entirely different from what has been mentioned; it must be ridiculous to assign the Change, or new Situation of the Parts of any Body, as the Cause of any new Motion; for it is evident, that a Piece of Matter, of one *given Texture, or Situation* of Parts, must ever, and invariably, have the *same Texture*, unless it either moves, or is put into Motion: To affirm then that the new Texture is the Cause of the *Motion*, or new Direction, whilst it never could have acquired the new Texture, but from *Motion*, is singularly absurd.

§. LXXIX. The Subject of this first Postulatum must (according to this Gentleman's Hypothesis) be *impossible*; and he has accordingly taken Care to *guard* it with a Parenthesis:

renthefis: But that (I am afraid) will be too *feeble a Fence* againſt the Imputation of writing inconſiſtently. For if 'tis impoſſible to ſuppoſe a Body at Reſt, it muſt be ridiculous to talk of its being put, or putting itſelf into Motion; or if it can be put into Motion, it is ridiculous to ſay that Motion is *eſſential* to Matter: Yet in theſe *incompatible Principles*, (thus jumbled together) our Author's Reaſoning conſiſts. For he ſuppoſes Motion *eſſential* to Matter, and reſts the Proof of it upon what muſt be utterly falſe, and inconceivable, if that was true.

§. LXXX. But I appeal to any candid and impartial Reader, whether what follows is not a plain Departure from the Argument in one Inſtance, and a begging of the Queſtion in the other? For the *Enquiry* being concerning the

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Spring.

Spring of human Actions; and the Point to be adjusted (in the first Place) being whether Man is free, upon the Supposition that the Whole of his Composition is material; it is a Desertion of the Question, and quite foreign to the Argument, to insist that *that only which hath the Power of Impulse and Contact can move Body*; for this is actually implied in the Supposition that the thinking Substance is material. For nobody Disputes whether what is material hath the *Power of Impulse*, or not; but whether it can *move*, without being *impelled* by other Bodies. And admitting that *what has undergone no Change, or Alteration in its Texture, no new Quality can be affirmed of*, it is begging the very Question in Dispute, to say that *what hath not been acted upon by Impulse and Contact, must still continue in the same Frame*.

§. LXXXI. This (in Fact) is the Amount of all that hath been said by this Gentleman against human Liberty, *that no Body at Rest can be put into Motion, but by the Impulse of some other Body*; (of which Position particular Notice will be taken under the third Division) (p). But whereas the Question was concerning the Power a Body had of putting itself into Motion; it was incumbent upon him to prove that no Body could have that Power.

— But it must appear that the only Argument, that can be alledged against the Possibility of such a Notion, must be founded upon Principles that are utterly inconsistent with its having a Power of Thinking. For the Reason that is given, or must be supposed, why a Body that is either in Motion, or at Rest, would eternally remain in the same Condition, if not *stopt* when in Mo-

(p) Vide §. CXI.

tion, or *impelled* when at Rest, by some other Body, is, that no one unites in the *complex Idea* of Matter, or Body, any *Powers* of *Thinking*, *Willing*, or *Resolving*, with which only the *Power* of *Self-determination* is compatible: Supposing therefore Matter capable of *Thought*, *Intelligence*, and *Volition*, the Difficulty of conceiving it capable of *Liberty*, or *Self-Motion* must entirely vanish; because the Absence of those *Qualities* is the only Reason from whence can be inferred the Want of the other.

§. LXXXII. If it is objected to this, that there is no Connection between *Intelligence*, the *Resolution* of doing any Thing, and the *Power* of *Self-determination*; but that Thought and Volition must result from some *peculiar Modification* of that Substance which thinks, and that every Action (in like Manner must

must spring from the same Root, all which are physical and necessary: This (I presume) hath been already sufficiently answered, (*q*) where it was supposed that a thinking Substance might have the Power of giving itself different Textures , or Modifications , from whence our Author *hypothetically* deduces, that its different *Thoughts*, *Resolutions*, and *Actions*, must flow. And this I surely may have the Liberty of supposing, as no Proof is given, or so much as aimed at, that a thinking Substance cannot have the Power of varying its own Texture.

§. LXXXIII. This may suffice to shew, that if *this Gentleman's* Arguments for Materiality have the Weight he would persuade us they have; or if *Thinking*, *Willing*, and

(*q*) *Vide supra*, pag. 75.

all the *Properties* of Mind, are Affections of material Substances only ; yet no effectual Proof can be brought from thence, to manifest that we are necessitated in every Instance ; which I flatter myself (by this Time) appears to the full Satisfaction of every unprejudiced Reader. — But if he has failed in his Attempt to prove that the whole of our Composition is *Matter*, (as I think he has, and have given the Reasons upon that Question, that convinced me of the Fallacy of his) it will appear that the whole of his succeeding Reasoning must be false, and inconclusive. For *Materiality* being the only *Soil* in which such Principles can shoot up, if that which is the *Nursery* of them is taken away, the Principles are too weak, to stand by themselves ; but must die off, and wither in Course.

§. LXXXIV. But the Vanity of attempting to shew, that Mankind are not free Beings, must appear from the constant Experience that every one has within himself that he is free; and every Argument for a Doctrine of such baneful Tendency as *Fate*, or *Necessity*, however specious in itself, seems to be no more than a *dexterous* Kind of *Juggling* us into a Conceit of that which we know beforehand to be impossible. So that *Philosophy* or (to speak more properly) that which is *miscalled Philosophy* cannot be admitted to bear any Part in a *Question of this Nature*; which is better understood from the *self-evident Principles of common Reason and common Sense*, which are generally too much neglected in *Controversies of this Kind*.

§. LXXXV.

§. LXXXV. To this our Author perhaps will object, *that it is ridiculous to rest the Issue of a Dispute upon what each Man experiences, concerning a Point they are divided about (r)*; tho' if that was to determine the Question, he is so candid as to allow, *that almost every Man in the World would bear Testimony for Liberty (s)*, which is a sufficient Indication, that their Testimony is according to Truth, if it is founded upon Experience: So that the ingenious *Author* of the *minute Philosopher* is sufficiently justified in using that Method of Refutation which *our Author* condemns, as the *Philosopher* of old was, who only *peripateticised* upon the Sophisms of a Brother, who was reasoning against the Possibili-

(r) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 31.

(s) *Ibid.* pag. 32.

ty of Motion: For to say that Reason can be brought against Experience, will be to set up *Philosophy* against *Sense*, and *Demonstration* against what is *self-evident*: But however manifest the Simplicity of such an Undertaking must be, some Gentlemen have taken a strange Delight in it, imagining (as I suppose) that it would lessen the Glory of their Atchievements, to aim at a Proof of any Thing but an Impossibility. The most pertinent Answer therefore that one can think of, to such as are Advocates for *Necessity*, would be to shew that Man is a *free Being*, by his *Actions*, as the *Philosopher* did, that there was such a Thing as *Motion*, by his Walking about the Room.

§. LXXXVI. But this Question (which has contributed as much to the Puzzling of the Understandings

ings of some, as to the Exercise of the Wit of others) may be rendered less liable to Objection for the future, by the following Reasoning, which is offered in Support of it, and which may serve to *close* up this *Division*.

§. LXXXVII. By human Liberty is meant *a Power to act or not to act as the Mind directs*. And that Man has such a Power, may be demonstrated from the following Propositions.

First, *That we have an Idea of such a Power*. And,

Secondly, *That the Idea of that Power is a simple Idea*.

§. LXXXVIII. That we have an *Idea* of such a Power must be granted; or else it will follow, that it would be as impossible to reason or discourse about it, as for a blind Man

Man to reason about *Colours*, or of the Modes of *Perception*, which other Beings may have by a *sixth Sense*, of which he has no Manner of Conception, or *Idea* at all.

§. LXXXIX. That it is a *simple Idea* is evident from hence, that when any one endeavours to explain it, it is no otherwise than by mentioning the *concomitant Circumstances* of the *Idea*, and not by Definition; for a Definition being a Recital of the several *simple Ideas* that coincide to make up the Composition of a *complex one*, it is impossible to define what hath no Composition at all, and consequently, to explain it by any other Method than by appealing to what every one *experiences* or *feels* within himself when he acts.

§. XC. It follows therefore, if we have an *Idea* of that *Power*,
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and if that *Idea* is a *simple* one, that we must be possessed of the *Power* which constitutes *Liberty* or *Freedom*; because otherwise we never could have had the *Idea* of the *Power*: It being as impossible for any one to have the *Idea* of a *Power* of which he was never actually possessed, as for a blind Man to have that of *Colours* which he never saw, or for one that is deaf to have that of *Sounds* which he never heard.

§. XCI. A little deliberate Attention upon the Nature of our *simple Ideas*, as they occur in the Understanding, will make every one see the Strength of this Argument, and the Certainty of its Conclusion: The Want of which has ministered to much *vain Jangling*, and *darkened* a Point otherwise naturally *perspicuous*. It may not therefore be besides our present Purpose

Purpose to be somewhat more particular upon *simple Ideas*, which may *clear* up a Question that hath been rendered *obscure* both by the religious and irreligious Attempters in that Way.

§. XCII. That able and learned Writer Mr. *Locke*, in treating of our *simple Ideas*, judiciously observes, that “ The Dominion of
 “ Man in that little World, his Understanding, is much the same as
 “ it is in the great World of visible Things; wherein his Power
 “ (however managed by Art and Skill) reaches no farther than to
 “ compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand,
 “ but can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new
 “ Matter, or destroying one Atom of what is already in Being.
 “ And the same Inability will every one find in himself, who shall
 “ go

“ go about to fashion in his Under-
 “ standing, any *simple Idea* not
 “ received in by his Senses, from
 “ external Objects, or by Reflection
 “ from the Operations of his own
 “ Mind about them (t).”

§.XCIII. The Justness and Truth
 of this Observation of Mr. *Locke*
 will appear from hence, if it were
 possible to frame or invent any *new*
simple Idea, then it would follow
 that one who was always deaf,
 might form the *Idea* of the *Sound*
of a Trumpet; or that one who
 was always without the Use of his
 Eyes, might frame that of a *scarlet*
Colour, which no one, I imagine,
 will venture to affirm, but who has
 lost the Use of his Understanding.
 For it is as impossible for any one
 to frame any particular new *simple*

(t) Essay concerning *Human Understanding*,
 Book II. Chap. II. Sect. 2.

Idea,

Idea, though he may have the proper *Inlets* for that Perception, as it would be for another, who wants the *Organs* necessary for the Reception of it: it being exactly the same, with Regard to the Incapacity of perceiving, whether one wants the *Organs* requisite for the Reception of the *Idea*, or the *Object* necessary to raise it: that is a Man would be as much in the Dark in Reference to the *Idea* of *Scarlet*, if he was never conversant with any Substance that could raise that *Perception*, as another would be who was always without *Eyes*, the necessary *Mediums* through which that *Idea* must be conveyed.

§. XCIV. The Case is manifestly different, with regard to Ideas that are complex; for here the Mind can arbitrarily collect any Number, and unite them under one Name, as in the Instances of *mixed Modes*,

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Idea,

collective Ideas of Substances, and of all *Fantastical Compositions*. One may form the Idea of *Ostracism* a Species of Banishment in Use amongst the *Athenians*, or that of *Proscription* amongst the *Romans*, though he never saw an Instance of the *Ostracism* of the one People or of the *Proscription* of the other. He may (in like Manner) have the Idea of a *Fleet* or an *Army*, though he never beheld either; or of that *Monster*, or *Medley Piece* described by *Horace*, with a *Human Head*, a *Horse's Neck*, and the *Tail of a Fish* (u), though there is no such Thing existing in *Rerum Natura*. The Reason for which is that these *Ideas* are compounded of other *Ideas* which he had before, which all ultimately terminate in the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, which are the Constituents or first

(u) Vide *Horace de Arte Poetica*.

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Principles of all our Ideas, or the *Atoms* (if I may so speak) by the *Concourse* of which is formed our *World* of Imagination.

§. XCV. But it is absolutely impossible for any one to form any new *simple Idea*; the Want of a close Attention to which (as Mr. *Locke* justly observes (*w*)) hath produced those *eminent Trifles* with which some Writers abound in their Definitions of the Names of *simple Ideas*. For as *simple Ideas* are only to be got from outward Objects by the Impressions they make upon our Organs, or from the Operations of our own Minds, if they are not received in one of these Ways, every Word made use of in the Definitions of them will be quite insignificant.

(*w*) *Locke's Essay* Book 3. Chap. 4. Sect. 8.

§. XCVI. Let any one try to form in his Mind the particular Relishes of Meats, or Liquors that he never tasted, and he will find the Attempt as fruitless as to endeavour to create, or annihilate. And for one to expect that he can form any Relish by a Definition in the Mind of another whose Palate is a Stranger to that Substance which raises it, will be to think that a Man can *taste* with his *Ears*; which when any one is arrived at the Faculty of accomplishing, I will also conclude that it is easy for him to have his *Hunger* satisfied with *Words*.

§. XCVII. The same Incapacity must any one find in himself to fashion in his Mind the *Idea* of that Species of *Power* called *Liberty*, or *Freedom*, was there never a given Instance of his possessing the *Power itself*. The Advocates for Necessity there-

therefore must fall under the following *Dilemma*: Either they must be reduced to deny that they have any *Idea* of *Liberty*, or else to affirm that the *Idea* of *Liberty*, is not a *simple Idea*. If they deny that they have any *Idea* of *Liberty*, the Whole of their *profound Reasoning*, in order to prove that Man is no more than a Piece of *Mechanism*, will evidence nothing but the *Shal- lowness* of such an Undertaking. For they must be obliged to grant that they mean nothing; if mentioning the Term *Liberty*, and affirming at the same Time that they have no manner of *Idea*, or *Conception* of it be talking without a Meaning; which no one (I imagine) will contest. If they grant that they have an *Idea* of *Liberty*, but affirm at the same Time that it is a *Complex Idea*, they would do well to mention the precise Collection of those *simple Ideas* by which this *Complex*

one is framed. But when any one endeavours to define, or more properly to explain it, it is done by a Recital of the *concomitant Circumstances* of that *Idea*, as hath been said above. (x)

§. XCVIII. Thus when Mr. *Locke* says that *Liberty is a Power in any Agent to do, or forbear any Action according to the Determination, or Thought of his Mind* (y); the Determination and Thought are Circumstances that accompany Liberty, and without which it would be impossible for one to be free; but the *Idea of Freedom* is no more a *Complex* of the *Determination, and Thought of the Mind*, than the *Idea of Light* is of a Number of Globules that strike upon the Bottom of the

(x) *Vide supra*, page 93.

(y) Essay concerning Human Understanding
Book 2. Chap. 21. Sect. 8.

Eye, without which it would be impossible to have the *Idea* of *Light*. And the *Ideas* which the Words *Thought* and *Determination* signifie, would no more furnish us with the *Idea* of *Liberty*, if we were never free, than the *Ideas* of the different Bulk of the *Rays* of *Light* would furnish us with that of *Light* itself, if we were always blind.

§. XCIX. Again when the same Author says, that *Power* includes in it a *Relation to Action, or Change*, (z) he cannot mean that *Action, or Change*, are the *Constituents* of it, any more than the *Parts* of any *Parcel of Matter* are the *Constituents* of *Extension, Figure, and Motion*; to which it will be granted they all bear a *Relation*; or than the *Bulk Figure, Texture, and Motion* of the *Parts of Matter* constitute all *Colours*,

(z) Essay Book 2. Chap. 21. Sect. 3.

Tastes,

Tastes, and Smells. Our *Idea* of *Power* therefore (as Mr. *Locke* concludes) may well have a *Place* amongst our *simple Ideas*, and be considered as one of them (a).

§. C. In the same Essay he says (b), " That *Power* is another of those *simple Ideas*, which we receive both from Sensation, and Reflection. For observing in ourselves that we do, and can think, and that we can at Pleasure move several Parts of our Bodies which were at Rest; the Effects also that Natural Bodies are able to produce in one another occurring every Moment to our Senses, we both these Ways get the *Idea* of *Power*." *Liberty* then is one of our *simple Ideas* received from Reflection; and as each *simple Idea* is

(a) *Ibid.*

(b) Book 2. Chap. 7. Sect. 8.

one *single*, and *uncompounded Appearance*, such as the Mind can neither *create*, nor *destroy*, we must be possessed of that *Power* which constitutes *Liberty*, or else it would be impossible ever to have had the *Idea* of it, as hath been sufficiently demonstrated.

§. CI. The Reader (I hope) will pardon my spinning out this Argument to such a Length. It might (I confess) have been contained within a less Compass: but as the Principle it is brought in to support is of the greatest Importance, and the Argument itself new, at least to me, I was desirous of fixing his Attention longer here than to some may seem necessary: and I flatter myself I shall have done some small Service to *Truth*, and *Religion in general*, (the Establishment of which is my only Aim) if by an Enlargement of this Nature, and shewing the Argument

ment in several Lights, some Part of it at least may strike his Fancy. For as easy as it may seem to *conceive* what will shape out Conviction to ones self, it is certainly difficult to be *delivered* of it in such a Manner as shall give tolerable Satisfaction to another. *Truth* here will not easily be *struck* off at one *Heat*; and one cannot always hit upon that happy Dexterity of Expression (especially upon Subjects of a Metaphysical Nature) that requires no Exposition: but the Argument must be retouched, and revised, *the Substance of it differently modified*, and represented in several Views before the Meaning it is supposed to convey is sufficiently understood, and the Force of it felt. Whether it hath that real Force, I have insinuated, I must leave the candid Reader to determine: but of this I will venture to assure him, had it not some Weight, and Significancy with me I should have been

been ashamed to have palmed it upon him. That I may be mistaken here, is far from an Impossibility; though I can't see where the Error, and Delusion can have crept in. This may arise (perhaps some will say) from a fond Partiality to my own Doctrine: let any one then who can further penetrate into the different *Mazes* of this Question, and has a better *Clew* of Reasoning to guide himself through these *Labyrinths* detect the Fallacy of this, or of any Thing else I have offered upon this Subject, and I shall willingly retract what I have said, and follow him and Truth wherever they shall please to lead me.

§. CII. Having thus gone through with what I proposed to consider under the second Division, and shewn that Mankind *have the Power to act, or not to act free from any Impediment, or Restraint*; Order requires

requires that I should now proceed to shew that there must have been a *Beginning of Motion*, or a *First Mover*.

§. CIIL. As the Advocates for true, and genuine *Theism* have brought abundant Proof from Motion, to shew that there must be a *First Mover*, their Adversaries have endeavoured to turn their own Artillery against them, and from this Principle have insisted that a *First Mover* is impossible. The Theist hath consistently maintained, that as an *infinite Series* of the Causes of Motion, without any Original, or *First Cause*, is impossible; so when any one supposes that a Body in Motion receives that *Quality* from the *Impulse* of another Body, and this its Motion from the Impulse of some other, the Mind in ascending this *Scale* must somewhere make a Stop, and naturally conceive a *First Cause*, or Beginning

ginning of Motion. The Atheist on the other Hand, hath inconsistently imagined (*c*) that a Body in Motion must receive that *Quality*, or be determined to that Motion by the *Impulse* of some other Body, and that by some other, and so on in *Infinitum* without any Original, or *First Mover*.

§. CIV. *Our Author* indeed hath not avowed a Doctrine so glaringly absurd, and ridiculous, but seemingly hath with more Caution delivered his Sentiments on this Point, and only supposed Motion *essential* to Matter. But this Principle instead of being supported is undermined, and betrayed by his Management in

(*c*) Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, & illud iterum ab alio, & sic in infinitum.

Spinozæ Ethic.

the

the Defence of it, as hath been shewn above. (d) For was his *Postulatum* true that *no Body at Rest could be put into Motion but by the Impulse of some other Body*; It would be so far from proving that Motion is *essential* to Matter, that it would evidence quite the contrary, and prove that there never could be such a *Quality* as Motion. For when he affirms that the *Impulse* of one Body upon another is the only accountable Method for the Generation of Motion, this implies *ex Hypothesi* somewhere such a *Quality* as Rest; for it would be absolute Nonsense to affirm that what was never at Rest could be put into Motion: and if some Matter is, or ever was at Rest, this destroys this Gentleman's *Idol* Notion that Motion is *essential* to Matter; and if Motion is not *essential* to Matter,

(d) *Vide supra* pag. 83.

and

and no Body can be moved, but what is put into Motion by some other Body, there never could be such a *Quality* as Motion at all. For I suppose it will be granted, if at any given Time every Part of Matter was at Rest, and if no Part of it could be moved but by the *Impulse* of some other Part, no Part of it could ever be put into Motion, and that there was a Time in which all Matter was at Rest must be granted, unless we suppose that Motion is *essential* to Matter, which according to *this Gentleman's Premises* is ridiculous in the highest Degree, though he has endeavoured to establish it in his *Conclusion*.

§. CV. But admitting his Supposition (*that no Body at Rest could be put into Motion, but by the Impulse of some other Body*) was not incompatible with the Doctrine he builds
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upon this Foundation, yet how does it appear that the Generation of Motion can be attributed to no other Cause?

§. CVI. His Argument for it is to this effect, that every *Quality* must result from the *Texture*, and *Frame* of its Subject; and no *new Quality* can be affirmed of any Substance, unless that Substance acquires a new *Texture*, or Situation of its Parts. When a Body therefore is put into Motion that was at Rest before, this can be done in no other Way than by an Alteration of its *Texture*, and *Frame*; because Motion is a new Quality acquired: and *that Body which hath not been acted upon by Impulse, and Contact must still continue in the same Texture*; But whatever hath the Power of *Impulse* and *Contact* must be material, and consequently no Body at Rest can be put into Motion,

but

but by the *Impulse* of some other Body.

§. CVII. To this it may be replied in the first Place, if every *Quality* results from the *Texture* and Frame of its Subject, no *Quality* whatever can be *essential* to any Subject; because by a Variation of the *Texture*, that *Quality* which might have been before affirmed of the Subject must cease, and a new one be acquired; and consequently *Motion* cannot be *essential* to all, or to any given Quantity of Matter. And if that Species of Motion which *this Gentleman* supposes *essential* to Matter is (as he expressly affirms) (e) *as much the necessary Result of the Constitution, and Frame of the Bodies so in Motion, as any other Quality, or Attribute that could be predicated of them*; the Reader may

(e) *Philosophical Enquiry*, pag. 34.

collect sufficient from his Enquiry to conclude, that he must contradict himself in one and the same Breath in supposing Motion *essential to all, or any given Quantity of Matter*; because that Constitution and Frame from which that Species of Motion results may be altered.

§. CVIII. It will be in vain to reply to this, that the Motion meant here is not Motion in any particular Direction, or Motion considered *specifically*, but *generically*; and that by varying the Texture of any Body, Motion will not cease, but only that Species of it, which might have been affirmed of the Body before the Variation of its Texture. For (besides that he tells his Readers by Bodies, which are in a *particular Direction*, &c. he means that *Species of Motion which may be supposed essential to Matter*;) every particular Direction is excluded.

in this *general Idea* of Motion, it never can rationally be contended for, that Motion is *essential* to Matter, for if Motion in no particular Direction is *essential*, no Motion at all can be so; because the Motion supposed essential to Matter, must be in some Direction.

§. CIX. But 2dly, no Body can undergo any Change, or Variation in its *Texture*, unless it is first moved: the Alteration from *Motion* to *Rest* therefore does not result from the Alteration in the *Texture* of the Subject, but the *Alteration* of the *Texture* from *Motion*. And to assert the contrary will be to put the Cause for the Effect, and the Effect for the Cause.

§. CX. Thirdly, admitting that whatever hath the Power of *Impulse* must be material, how does it

appear that *that Body which hath not been acted upon by Impulse and Contact must still continue in the same Frame?* This is far from being a self-evident Proposition; and *our Author* has offered nothing in his whole *Enquiry* to convince his Readers that it must be true. Besides it hath been already shewn, that a thinking Being, as such, hath the Power of moving Body, in the Instances of all *voluntary Motions* (f): and if his Reasoning to the contrary is of any Force, or Significance, it will turn against his own Principles. For if *thinking Beings* as such have no Power of moving Bodies by *Thought*, and *Volition*; because *Qualities, or Attributes, are incapable of any Action, or Causality*, a *solid Being* as such must be incapable of moving Bodies

(f) *Vide supra*, pag. 68.

by *Impulse and Contact* for the same Reason.

§. CXI. Though this Proposition of our Author's (*that a Body which hath not been acted upon by Impulse, and Contact must still continue in the same Frame*) may certainly be denied with a much better Grace than it is affirmed, upon this single Account, that it is no more than an unsupported Assertion. But to affirm it in Contradiction to the constant Experience which we have within ourselves of the contrary, in all our *voluntary Motions*, and against the received Notion we have of the *Power of the Deity* to vary the *Frame of the material World*, and put it into Motion, (against *whose Power* thus to order Things, and even against *whose very Existence* this is asserted without any Reason, or Foundation at all) must be very

extraordinary. But the Falseness of this Proposition will sufficiently appear, from the following Reasoning, which is offered to shew that there must have been a *Beginning of Motion*.

§. CXII. Either Motion must have been communicated from one Piece of Matter to another in a continued Chain, or Series, without any Original or *first Cause*;

Or Motion must be *essential* to Matter;

Or else there must have been some *first Cause*, upon which all Motion originally must depend.

If the two former Propositions are proved false, the last must of Necessity be true.

§. CXIII. The first Proposition is a Contradiction in Terms: because it supposes, that all Bodies which were ever in Motion had their

their Motion communicated; but whatever had its Motion communicated was once at Rest; it follows therefore that all Bodies were once at Rest, if all Bodies had their Motion communicated; and yet this is implied in the very Terms of the Proposition, that some *one Piece*, or *given Quantity* of Matter at least, never had a *Beginning* of *its Motion*.

§. CXIV. Thus the first Proposition cannot be true; and the second may be proved equally false; For to suppose that Motion is *essential* to Matter, will be to suppose it *essential* for Matter to move either in one particular and determined Direction, or in several different Directions. But to suppose it essential to Matter to move in one particular and determined Direction, will be to suppose it impossible, that it should at any Time move
in

in a different Direction: but there is no Body which at one Time moves in a particular Direction, but what at another Time may move in a different Direction. Consequently it cannot be *essential* to Matter to move in one *particular* and *determined* Direction.

§. CXV. Again to suppose it essential to Matter to move in several Directions is a Contradiction; for that in Effect will be to suppose it may move in a *strait Line*, in a *Circle*, and in an *Ellipsis*, or in short every Way at once.

§. CXVI. But further, whatever is essential to any Substance is that without which it is impossible to conceive that Substance now to be, or ever to have been. Thus the *Ideas* of *Parts*, *Solidity*, and *Extension* are necessarily involved in the
Idea

Idea of *material Substance*, and without which we cannot have any *Idea* of Body; but we can conceive a Body capable of being at Rest, which would be impossible, if Motion was *essential* to Matter. The first and second Propositions being thus proved false, it follows by a necessary Consequence, that there must be some *first Cause*, upon which all Motion originally must depend.

§. CXVII. What now remains to be considered is, whether Motion originally must depend upon some *intelligent Principle*; but there can be no great Difficulty, that attends the Solution of this Question: For to suppose the contrary, will be to run into the Absurdities above mentioned; for that which is *unintelligent* can only be acted upon, and can be no Cause of Motion, unless it is first put into Motion by something

something else; but then it can be no *original Cause*.

§. CXVIII. Human Understanding indeed traces in vain the Manner how Motion originally was caused by Mind; but this surely can be Reason sufficient to no one to deny it possible, unless to him who proudly places himself at the Top of Things; who makes his own Ability the Measure of all *potential Truths*, and concludes every Thing impossible to be done, the *Modus* of which is beyond his Comprehension.

§. CXIX. But as the Absurdity imputed to this Doctrine (that Motion originally must be the Effect of Mind) can appear only from a strict Demonstration, that it is *essential* to Matter, and as this hath been already proved impossible; it must originally depend upon Mind: for

to affirm that it could not be the Effect of Mind, when it is not *essential* to Matter, will be in the Issue to affirm that it was effected without any Cause at all. For says the Gentleman I am disputing with, *No Body at Rest (supposing that possible) can be moved, or acted upon so as to be put into Motion, by any Thing but the physical Impulse, or Contact of some other Body:* but the Motion of all Bodies cannot be accounted for upon this *Principle*: we must then either recur to the Absurdity of supposing Motion *essential* to Matter, or to that of attributing an Effect to no Cause at all, or else we must allow that Motion originally must depend upon *Mind*.

§. CXX. To conclude, as the Consequence which may be deduced from the Establishment of *our Author's* Principles is too obvious and plain;

plain; so it must follow, if what
 have endeavoured to support is true
 that there must be a *supreme Being*
 the *Contriver*, and *Governor* of
 all Things, and that the *Variety* of
Motions in all animated and inani-
 mated Beings can be *reconciled* ori-
 ginally with nothing but a govern-
 ing *Mind*, or *understanding Prin-*
ciple, and that whoever thinks the
 contrary must himself be void of
Understanding.

F I N I S.



ERRATUM.

Page 44. line 5. read that it did them,